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ABSTRACT: The search model contains two matching technologies, the public
employment service (PES) with its type-specific registers for workers and va-
cancies, and the search market where firms advertise vacancies and unem-
ployed who have not been placed by the PES search for jobs. The placement
activity of the PES increases the bargained wages, reduces active job search,
decreases the number of advertised vacancies, but - compared with the lais-
sez-faire regime - increases employment and per capita consumption. Of all
the instruments of ALMP, the probabilities of a match, the portion of unskilled
not interested in a job, and the hiring subsidies generate crowding-out effects.
The productivity of the unskilled, (re-employment)bonuses, penalties for viola-
tions of the search rule, and the stringency of the search rule cause crowding-
in effects. Assistance for "problem groups" is less effective than promoting ac-
tive job search.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Das Suchmodel umfasst zwei Matching-Technologien, die
des PES mit typspezifischen Registern für Arbeitslose und Vakanzen und die
des Suchmarkts, wo Firmen Vakanzen annoncieren und nicht Vermittelte nach
Stellen suchen. Die Vermittlungstätigkeit des PES erhöht die Lohnkosten, redu-
ziert die aktive Suche und die annoncierten Vakanzen, senkt im Vergleich zum
Laissez-faire Regime die Arbeitslosenquote und steigert den Pro-Kopf-Konsum.
Von den Instrumentvariablen der ALMP verdrängen die Matchwahrscheinlich-
keiten, der Anteil der „Arbeitsunwilligen“ und die Lohnkostenzuschüsse Arbeits-
plätze. Die Produktivität der Geringqualifizierten, (Wiederbeschäftigungs-)
Prämien, Sanktionen für Suchregel-Verstöße sowie die Intensität der Regel-
durchsetzung senken die Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Förderung von „Problem-
gruppen“ ist weniger wirkungsvoll als die Förderung der aktiven Jobsuche.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Active labour market policy (ALMP) is designed to enhance the productivity
and qualifications of unemployed job seekers, to improve their search and
self-presentation techniques, and – given a limited demand for labour – to al-
locate the available jobs of a country more evenly. In Europe and Scandina-
via, ALMP consumes a sizeable amount of resources - within the OECD on
average 0.9% of GDP in 1996 (Martin 1998). Efficiency gains of ALMP are
hard to measure. Many authors estimate that they are modest or even nega-
tive if job-creation and saved insurance and transfer payments are balanced
against the high expenses of the public employment service (PES) for training,
wage and income subsidies, and especially for job-creation programmes.
Nevertheless, in the reform of social security systems in Europe, wage and in-
come subsidies seem to have a bright future (Snower 1997; Phelps 1997;
OECD 1998). ALMP is considered to be relatively successful if the instru-
ments are tailored to well-defined (problem) groups, or if they are designed to
intensify job search (OECD 1993a, 1996a). On the other hand, job-creation
schemes and subsidies are often criticised as having considerable deadweight
losses and crowding-out effects. Deadweight losses exist if job seekers or
suppliers of vacancies are subsidised even though they would have ended up
with job contracts without help. Substitution effects are present if subsidised
persons or vacancies crowd out those that are not supported by the subsidies.
In this paper, we discuss the substitution effects and the crowding-out effects
of ALMP using a simulation model with a fully integrated PES and a private
search market.
Aside from microeconometric studies of ALMP (LaLonde 1995) there are two
approaches that analyse the interdependence between ALMP and the aggre-
gate unemployment rate. The first consists of macroeconometric regressions
(Layard et al. 1991; OECD 1993a; Calmfors 1994; Calmfors and Skedinger
1995; Burda and Lubyova 1995; Scarpetta 1996; Bellmann and Jackman
1996; Nickell 1997; Büttner and Prey 1998; Nickell and Layard 1999; Blan-
chard and Wolfers 1999). In those papers, the estimating equation is usually
based on a labour market theory that goes back to Layard and Nickell (1986)
and Layard et al. (1991) and has become a standard framework for labour
market analysis. Calmfors (1994) has modified the standard model and, fol-
lowing OECD (1993a), has provided a classification of ALMP effects that has
been widely used since. Calmfors identifies three effects that influence aggre-
gate employment through the labour demand function, the productivity effect,3
the substitution effect, and the deadweight loss which is connected with the
active policies. The competition effect and the incentive effect work through
the wage-setting function. Finally, effects that directly influence the matching
process can express themselves either through the demand or through the
wage-setting function. The second approach focuses on the simulation of
ALMP and uses a labour market model which is based on the more recent
theory of two-sided-search (Millard and Mortensen 1997; Mortensen 1994).
This branch of search theory employs a matching function to model the infor-
mation imperfections and the heterogeneities of the labour market (Diamond
1982; Pissarides 1986, 1990; Hosios 1990; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
1999).
The results of the macroeconometric regressions suffer from identification and
endogeneity problems (OECD 1993a; Calmfors and Skedinger 1995; Jack-
man and Bellmann 1996). Nevertheless, Layard et al. (1991), OECD (1993a),
Nickell (1997), and Nickell and Layard (1999) find a significant negative cor-
relation between the ALMP budget and the aggregate rate of unemployment.
These studies focus on the competition effect as the main cause of the identi-
fied correlation. Training and counselling increase the competitiveness of the
participants of ALMP programmes and reduce the “discouraged-worker ef-
fect.” Thus the labour supply grows, and the employed are confronted with
more and better qualified competitors and with a reduced transition rate into
employment when becoming unemployed. Consequently, they will moderate
their wage demands, the wage-setting schedule will shift downwards, and
regular employment will increase. By contrast, Calmfors and Skedinger
(1995), using regional labour market data from Sweden, find a negative cor-
relation between job-creation programmes and regional employment. The
programmes crowd out regular jobs and, in the period 1973-90, had no signifi-
cant positive influence on employment anywhere in Sweden. The results of
Swedish training programmes are mixed. It is, however, clear that training
programmes show positive employment effects significantly more often than
job-creation programmes. Unlike Calmfors and Skedinger, Büttner and Prey
(1998) in their analysis of West German regional data for the period 1986-93
find no significant effects of training programmes while job-creation pro-
grammes are positively correlated with regional employment. Bellmann and
Jackman (1996) estimate the employment effects of specific ALMPs using
cross-sectional data from 17 OECD countries for the years 1975-93. The
study includes the budget of the PES, expenses for training and job-creation
programmes, and wage and income subsidies as explanatory variables. The4
authors find no significant correlation between these ALMPs and aggregate
employment. However, all four policy instruments have a significant influence
on the proportion of long-term unemployed: Training and the budget of the
PES reduce the incidence of long-term unemployment while job-creation pro-
grammes and subsidies increase it.
Millard and Mortensen (1997) use the matching model with endogenous sepa-
ration rate introduced by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999) and supple-
ment it with a finite duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, with
payroll taxes, severance payments, and a hiring subsidy for newly created
jobs. The authors show that the hiring subsidy is positively correlated with the
steady state rate of unemployment. They calibrate the model to the US labour
market and find that a hiring subsidy of 10% of the wage bill would cause the
unemployment rate to increase by 2.7 percentage points.
Following Pissarides (1979), our simulation model allows for the fact that in
Europe government organised placement services (PES) and private search
technologies coexist. Firms choose between the two search methods, and the
unemployed who have not been placed by the PES decide whether to search
for a job on their own. Skilled (type 1) and unskilled (type 2) unemployed are
registered separately with the employment service. Moreover, the PES offers
firms looking for (un-)skilled workers the opportunity to post their vacancies.
After the registration has terminated, the PES combines the registers and ar-
ranges a certain number of matches. Most matching models assume that the
unemployed have sufficient incentives to actively search for a job. Yet, active
job search is costly, and therefore the endogenous rate of job seekers is only
a fraction of the total number of unemployed. Certainly, search rules compel
the unemployed to engage in active job search, but, in spite of the impending
penalties, the PES is not at all able to get all unemployed who have not been
placed to actively search for a posted vacancy. While the PES ex ante puts
workers and notified vacancies in separate registers according to their type, in
the search market this separation happens ex post: Firms rank their applicants
according to the expected market value of the filled job. A second-rate worker
is employed only if no first-rate worker applies. The ranking order in our model
is endogenous and influenced by the ALMP.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the PES with its
registers for unemployed workers and vacancies. Section 3 describes the
search market. Section 4 contains a simulation of the substitution and crowd-5
ing out effects of ALMP, and experiments with the following parameters: (1)
the efficacy of the placement activities of the PES, (2) the percentage of un-
employed who participate in ALMP programmes, (3) the percentage of unem-
ployed who are “unwilling” to work, (4) the productivity of the unskilled, (5) the
share of skilled workers among the labour force, (6) the different hiring subsi-
dies, (7) the assistance for “problem groups”, and (8) re-employment bonuses
and penalties designed to increase the number of active job seekers among
the unemployed. The results are summarised in Section 5.
2. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
MATCHING TECHNOLOGY. As in Germany, Italy, and Japan (OECD 1996a), the
PES is a fully integrated system covering the three functions: placement serv-
ice, UI, and ALMP. The placement activities of the PES are represented by a
matching function  ) , ( i i i i R U M e µ  which indicates the number of matches for
type-i workers if  i U  unemployed and  i R  vacancies are on file in the registers
for type i. A percentage  i µ − 1  of the unemployed is participating in ALMP pro-
grammes so that of all  i U  workers only  i iU µ  are available for the placement
activities. Both firms and workers have unobservable characteristics and ex
ante are not entirely distinguishable from their competitors. But once contact is
made, both sides know with certainty whether the partner meets their expec-
tations, an event that with respect to the given placement efficacy of the PES
will happen with the probability  i e . The parameter  i e  is an effort variable ex-
pressing the screening capacity of the PES and the effort of its agents. The
matching function M is assumed to be differentiable, concave, and homoge-
nous of degree one, and to have positive derivatives in both arguments.
For type-i workers the transition rate into employment is  ≡ Θ ) , , ( i i i e P µ
= Θ ) / , 1 ( i i iM e µ i i i i i i U R U M e µ µ / ) , (  and the arrival rate at the registered va-
cancies is  i i i i i i i i i i i R R U M e M e e Q / ) , ( ) 1 , / ( ) , , ( µ Θ µ µ Θ = ≡ , where  i Θ  meas-
ures the tightness  i i U R /  between the number of registered vacancies and
the number of registered unemployed. As the tightness decreases, the arrival
rate tends to zero and the transition rate tends to infinity, an increasing tight-
ness drives  i P  to infinity, while  i Q  approaches zero. If the PES augments the
share of unemployed who participate in ALMP programmes ( i µ  decreases),
the transition rate increases while the arrival rate decreases. With growing
probability of a match,  i e , both the transition rate and the arrival rate increase.6
Only  i τ  of the registered unemployed of type i are interested in finding a job.
For simplicity we do not model the preferences of this type explicitly. How
many of the unemployed are actually willing to work is a question that is rarely
studied. Von Rosenbladt (1991) reports that according to estimates of the
German PES agents interviewed, approximately 21% of all registered unem-
ployed are not really looking for a job. Some PES agents even guess that 60%
of their clients are not interested in a new job. The information about those
preferences is asymmetrical. Only the unemployed themselves know whether
they prefer to live on UI benefits. Since availability for the placement service is
a precondition for UI payments, each unemployed must hide those prefer-
ences from investigations by the PES. Ex ante, we assume, firms only know
that the portion  i τ − 1  of the unemployed are not interested in taking up work;
ex post, all uncertainty about the job match is resolved, but neither the firm nor
the PES are able to tell whether a rejected job match is due to a lack of inter-
est on the side of the applicant or due to a mismatch, an event which happens
with the probability  i e − 1 . Thus, if the probabilities of the three events - con-
tact, interest, and aptitude - are independent from each other,  i iQ τ  is the arri-
val rate of interested applicants who meet the job profile.
ASSET EQUATIONS. In the steady state, the asset equations for the registered
vacancies, the unemployed who are willing to work, and the employed of type
i have the form:
) ( i R i i i i R i G V Q k rV + − + − = Π τ (1)
) ( i i i i V s w y r Π Π − + − = (2)
) ( i i i i i N W P B rN − + = (3)
) ( i i i i W N s w rW − + = (4)
) ( ) ( i R i i i i G N W TP + + − = Π (5)
i i i TP N W β = − ,( 6 )
where r denotes the interest rate,  R k  the costs of registration with the PES,
i y  the output of a job occupied by a worker of type i,  i w  the wage measured
in units of output,  i B  the reservation utility, and s the exogenous separation
rate.  i V ,  i Π ,  i N  and  i W  are the market values of a registered vacancy, a
filled job, a registered worker, and an employed worker respectively. Finally
i TP  is the present value of the match rent, the distribution of which is bar-
gained bilaterally between the firm and the job seeker. The result of the bar-
gain depends on the parameter β , representing the bargaining power of the
job applicant. The instruments of ALMP include hiring subsidies 
i R G  that in-7
crease the quasi-rent of a match. Hiring subsidies are paid to the firms that fill
their registered vacancies with unemployed workers sent by the PES.
REGISTERED VACANCIES. Suppliers of vacancies first decide whether to adver-
tise in the search market or to register their job with the PES. If they prefer
registration, they must choose between the two registers for the different types
of workers, unskilled and skilled. Both decisions depend on the market value
of the vacancies. Firms prefer the search method and the register that maxi-
mises the market value of their vacancy. Access to the search market and to
the registers is unlimited; thus, in equilibrium, vacancies have the same value
on all three submarkets. In addition, the perfectly elastic inflow of new vacan-
cies guarantees that in the steady state  0 = i V . Therefore it follows from (1)














Π .( 7 )
FILLED JOBS.  i Π  denotes the value of a job filled with a worker of type i. In the
steady state, an investor who ties up capital in a filled job receives the perma-
nent income  i rΠ , and, in the case of job destruction, suffers a capital loss
i V Π − , an event which occurs with the exogenous probability s. Since in
equilibrium  0 = V  it follows from (2) that the value of a filled job as in (7)
equals the present value of the expected cash flow. From (7) we can derive
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WORKERS. The permanent income  i rW  of an employed worker is determined
in equation (4), where  i i W N −  is the capital loss suffered by the worker when
his job is destroyed. In equation (3), the Bellman equation of the unemployed
human capital,  i B  is the endogenous reservation income for which
i i i g P b B γ ) 1 ( − − = ; here b represents UI benefits and  i i g P γ ) 1 ( −  the expected
penalty for violations of the search rule. Unemployed workers who do not re-
ceive a job offer through the PES must actively search for a job. The probabil-
ity that an unemployed worker will not be assigned a registered vacancy by
the PES is  i P − 1 . If he does not search actively but prefers to wait for future
job offers through the PES he violates the search rule. The PES will detect the8
shirker with probability γ  and reduce his UI benefits by a penalty equal to  i g
such as in Switzerland (OECD 1996b).
For the capital gain  i i N W −  that an unemployed worker realises upon transi-













= − ,( 9 )
where  i w  denotes the wage of a worker who accepts a registered vacancy
offered through the PES.
WAGE BARGAINING. The quasi-rent of a match is given by equation (5) consid-
ering that  0 = V . The firm and the job applicant negotiate the wage. As in the
generalised Nash solution, they distribute the rent so that equation (6) holds in
equilibrium. β  measures the bargaining power of the worker and is a constant
between zero and one determined by the prevailing labour law and social leg-
islation. With (3) and (5) through (9) the result of wage bargaining is
i R i i R i i i i i G s r k B y B w ) ( / ) ( + + + − + = β τ µ Θ β β . (10)
The wage income consists of two components: the endogenous reservation
income  i B  and the insider income. The insider income is the sum of the in-
sider’s share of the static quasi-rent  ) ( i i B y − β , his share of the transaction
costs  i i R ik τ µ Θ β / , and his share of the subsidy  i R G s r ) ( + β . The share of the
search costs depends on the tightness  i i i τ µ Θ /  measured in “efficiency units”
that prevails in the PES-administered market segment for type-i workers,
where  i Θ  represents the tightness between the registers for vacancies and for
unemployed workers,  i µ  the portion of unemployed workers who are available
for the placement activities by the PES, and  i τ  the portion of unemployed who
are interested in finding a job. The greater the number of workers who either
participate in ALMP programmes or are unwilling to work ( i µ  and  i τ  de-
crease), the higher the wage (10). Since the probability of a match,  i e , has a
symmetrical effect on the transition rate and the arrival rate of type i, it has no
direct influence on the wage level.
PES EQUILIBRIUM. The PES-administered labour market segment for workers
of type i is fully characterised by the wage and the tightness  ) , ( i i w Θ . In equi-
librium, the wage (10) reaches the level of wage costs (8), and the inflow of
new vacancies into the register for workers of type i stops. The wage-setting9
function (10) gives us a strictly monotonically increasing relationship between
wage and tightness in the  ) , ( i i w Θ plane; the entry condition (8) gives us a
strictly monotonically decreasing schedule. The intersection of the two sched-
ules determines the equilibrium of the PES-administrated labour market seg-
ment for workers of type i.
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS. Passive labour market policy (PLMP) through
higher UI payments, b, leads to an upward shift of the wage-setting schedule
(10) in the  ) , ( i i w Θ plane; consequently, the wage rate increases, the tightness
of the register  i Θ  decreases, and both the value of a filled job (7) and the in-
centive to accept the job (9) decrease. Due to the distribution rule (6), the in-
centive (9) and the value of the filled job (7) always change in the same direc-
tion. ALMP in the form of a higher probability γ  that shirking is detected or a
higher penalty  i g  decreases the reservation income and shifts the wage-
setting schedule downwards so that the wage decreases, the tightness in-
creases, and both the market value and the incentive to accept the job in-
crease. In contrast, the hiring subsidy  i R G  has an increasing effect on the
wage and the tightness of the registers.
The probability of a match  i e  works only through the entry condition (8)
causing it to shift upwards. Thus, the wage and the tightness increase, and
the incentive to accept a job offered through the PES decreases. Both the
portion of unemployed workers who are available for the placement activities
of the PES, i µ , and the portion of those willing to work, i τ , move the entry con-
dition (8) upwards and the wage-setting schedule (10) downwards; thus, the
tightness between the registers for type i increases when those portions grow.
At first sight any reaction of the equilibrium wage to changes in  i µ  and  i τ
seems possible. Whether the wage increases, decreases, or remains un-
changed depends on the reaction of the arrival rate  i iQ τ  as equation (8)
shows. Implicitly differentiating (8) and (10) one can show that the arrival rate
i iQ τ  does not react to changes in  i µ  but increases with  i τ  even though a
higher tightness reduces the frequency of contacts  i Q . Thus, using (8), it fol-
lows that the equilibrium wage increases with  i τ  while it does not react to  i µ .
With growing productivity  i y  both the wage-setting curve (10) and the entry
condition (8) are shifted upwards so that the wage increases. However, the
tightness between the registers also increases because the shift of the wage-
setting curve is smaller than the shift of the entry condition. With growing pro-
ductivity the current profit,  i i w y − , also increases. Thus, in the “natural equi-
librium” (without ALMP), the market value of a job occupied by a type-1 worker10
is higher than the market value of a job that is filled with a type-2 worker, since
2 1 y y >  and, moreover, since all unemployed get the same UI benefits b and
have the same bargaining power β .
3. THE SEARCH MARKET
Unemployed workers who have not been placed through the PES can and –
because of the search rule – must make an effort to screen the search market
for vacancies. But active job search is time-consuming and produces mone-
tary and psychological costs. Moreover, with a growing number of active job
seekers, the congestion externalities from search increase, the transition rates
into employment decrease, and the expected gain from search disappears,
such that the search strategy has no advantage in comparison to waiting pas-
sively for the PES to find an appropriate job. Therefore, in spite of the im-
pending penalties, in equilibrium only a certain fraction of the unemployed
workers who have not yet been placed by the PES are actively engaging in
job search.
Firms post vacancies on the search market as long as the market value of the
advertised vacancies is at least as high as that of the registered ones. Since
there are no barriers to entry the perfectly elastic inflow of new vacancies con-
tinues until the value of the advertised jobs drops to zero. Firms want to fill
their vacancies as soon as possible. Consequently, job advertisements are
not type-specific so that job seekers of both types apply. Firms employ those
applicants who maximise the expected market value of the filled job. For that
purpose they rank the applicants, accepting a second-rate worker only if no
first-rate worker shows up.
MATCHING TECHNOLOGY. The arrival rate  i q  for the  i S  active job seekers
among the  i U  unemployed type-i workers at the A advertised vacancies is
generated by the transaction technology of the search market. The number of
matches is determined by the matching function  ) , ( A S a m f i i . f is a shift factor
which can be interpreted as the probability of a match. The matching function
of the search market has the same properties as that of the PES. The arrival
rate of job seekers of type i is given by  = ≡ ≡ ) 1 , / ( ) , ( i i i i i a m f a q q θ θ
A A S a m f i i / ) , ( . Due to search externalities, the arrival rate  i q  is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function of the tightness of submarket i,  i i S A/ = θ , and a
monotonically increasing function of the search intensity  i a .11
RANKING ORDER. Firms rank applicants according to the expected market value
of the filled jobs. Let  + i  represent the group of first-rate workers and  − i  the
group of second-rate workers, then the market values of the filled jobs are
− + ≥ i i J J . The ranking order protects first-rate applicants against the conges-
tion externalities caused by the group of second-rate workers. In contrast, the
transition rate of second-rate workers not only depends on the tightness in the
submarket of the lower ranking type,  − − = i i S A/ θ , but also on the tightness
+ + = i i S A/ θ  of the higher ranking segment of the search market,
) ( ) ( + + + + = ≡ i i i i q p p θ θ θ (11)
) ( )] ( 1 [ ) , (
+ − + − + − − = ≡ i i i i i i q q p p θ θ θ θ θ . (12)
Due to positive externalities from search, both transition rates increase strictly
monotonically with the tightness of the respective submarket. In addition, the
transition rate of the second-rate group grows strictly monotonically with  + i θ .
ASSET EQUATIONS. The Bellman equations of the advertised vacancies and
those employed who have found a job through random search are
{} A A qV J J q q J q q J q q A k rV − + − + − + − = 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 , max ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( (13)
) ( i i i i E N s rE − + = ω (14)
i i A i i i J G N E TS + + − = ) ( , (15)
where  ) (A k  is the advertisement costs of a vacancy as a function of the ag-
gregate number of advertised vacancies, q is the arrival rate of job seekers at
an advertised job,  2 1 2 1 q q q q q − + = ,  A V  is the market value of an advertised
vacancy,  i J  is the market value of a filled job,  i E  is the value of an employed
worker of type i who has found a job through the search market,  i ω  is the
wage rate negotiated by the firm and the applicant,  i TS  is the quasi-rent of the
match, and  i A G  is a (re-employment) bonus which the PES – as in Japan
(OECD 1993c) – pays to active job seekers. The space for advertisements is
scarce. Thus, the firms’ search costs increase strictly monotonically with the
aggregate number of ads,  0 > ′ k .
FIRMS. The inflow of advertised vacancies into the search market stops as
soon as  0 = A V . Therefore, in the steady state, the value of an occupied job is
) /( ) ( s r y J i i i + − = ω , (16)12
with  i y  denoting the output of the job and  i ω  the wage rate measured in units
of output. Furthermore, using  0 = A V , it follows from (13) that in the steady
state
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( = − − + ≡ − − + + + − + A k J q q J q A H i i i i i i i A θ θ . (17)
WORKERS. Equation (3) determines the permanent income of an unemployed
worker,  i rN , and equation (14) the permanent income of an employed worker
who has found a job through active search,  i rE . The capital gain  i i i N E − = ∆
that an active job seeker realises upon transition into employment follows from
(3) and (14):
s r
N W P B
N E i i i i i
i i i +
− − −
= − ≡ ∆
) ( ω
, (18)
where the incentive to accept a job placement by the PES,  i i N W − , is deter-
mined by equation (9). The greater the gain from a PES placement, and the
higher the probability of such a match,  i P , the smaller the incentive to engage
in active search  i ∆ .
WAGE BARGAINING. The (re-employment) bonus 
i A G  is part of the quasi-rent
(15) that is distributed between the firm and the applicant through the wage
rate  i ω  so that in the bargaining equilibrium
i A i i TS G N E
i β = + − . (19)
From (15), (19), (3), and (14) it follows that the wage for type-i workers who
have found a job through random search is  − − + = i i i rN y ) 1 ( β β ω
i A G s r ) )( 1 ( + − β . Inserting (3) again and taking account of (5), (6), and (7), we
get the result of the bargaining between the parties in the search market:
i A i i R i i i i i G s r k B y B ) )( 1 ( / ) ( + − − + − + = β τ µ Θ β β ω . (20)
The registration costs  R k  and the tightness of the PES-administered labour
market measured in efficiency units,  i i i τ µ Θ / , also play a crucial role in the
wage negotiations in the search market. This is because an active job seeker
can base his wage demands on the permanent income of an unemployed
worker (3), which is the sum of the reservation income  i B  and the expected
capital gain  ) ( i i i N W P −  which he can count on in case the negotiations fail.
However, it follows from (5), (6) and (7) that the capital gain  i i N W −  upon
transition into a job offered through the PES equals the expected registration13
costs weighted with the relative bargaining power  ) 1 /( β β − . From this we can
infer that the wage on the search market is a function of  i i R ik τ µ Θ / .
Comparing (10) with (20) we can see that without intervention of the PES in
the submarkets for type-i workers, the “law of one wage” holds. Hiring subsi-
dies and (re-employment) bonuses drive a wedge between the wage bar-
gained in the search market and that bargained in the PES-administered la-
bour market such that the wage differential for type-i worker is non-negative,
0 ] ) 1 ( )[ ( ≥ − + + = − i A i R i i G G s r w β β ω . Search costs imply that we could ob-
serve a strictly positive wage differential and at the same time a strictly posi-
tive number of active job seekers, which is strictly smaller than the number of
unemployed who have not been placed by the PES.
ACTIVE JOB SEARCH. The capital gain (18) and the bonus  i A G  are the incen-
tives to search actively for an advertised vacancy. However, active job search
is costly. The number of unemployed workers who decide to actively engage
in job search increases until either all unemployed workers of one type who
have not been offered a job by the PES search actively, or  + i H  and  − i H , the
gains from search for first-rate and second-rate applicants, disappear, and the
unemployed are indifferent between active search and passive waiting for a
job offer through the PES
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = − + ≡ + + + + + + i i i A i i i a c G p H ∆ θ (21)
0 ) ( ) ( ) , ( = − + ≡ − − − − − + − i i i A i i i i a c G p H ∆ θ θ , (22)
where  i p  is the transition rate generated by the matching technology of the
search market, and  ) ( i a c  are the private search costs for type-i job seekers
that are a function of the intensity of the search. If we assume that the partici-
pants in ALMP programmes also have an opportunity to search actively for a
job, the upper limit for the number of active job seekers of type i, i S , is deter-
mined as follows. Out of  i U  unemployed  i i i U P µ  are well matched and could
sign a contract but only  i τ  are interested in accepting the offered job. There-
fore we have  i i i i i U P S ) 1 ( µ τ − ≤ . In the following, we analyse equilibria with
“interior solutions” so that for both types of workers:  i i i i i U P S ) 1 ( 0 µ τ − < < .
SEARCH MARKET EQUILIBRIUM. A search market equilibrium with the variables
) , , (
− + i i A θ θ  denoting the number of advertised vacancies, the tightness in both
submarkets, and the endogenous ranking order is characterised by the equa-
tions (17), (21), and (22). Since the incentive to search and the ranking order14
are exogenous with respect to the search market, the equation system is re-
cursive. First we determine  + i θ  using (21), then  − i θ  using (22), and finally the
number of advertised vacancies using (17).
Each period, out of  i L  workers of type i,  ) ( i i U L s −  lose their job. At the same
time,  i i i i i i S p U P + µ τ  unemployed find a new job. In the steady state, the in-
flow into the pool of unemployed equals the outflow so that the type-specific
rates of unemployment  i i i L U u / =  and the aggregate rate of unemployment u
are given by






i i i i i
i σ µ τ
, 2 2 1 1 u u u λ λ + = , (23)
where  = i σ i i U S /  is the rate of active job seekers among unemployed work-
ers of type i, and  i λ  is the fraction of type-i workers among the labour force
∑ = i L L .
4. SIMULATION
In order to measure the crowding-out and employment effects of the ALMP,
we first simulate a basic scenario without active measures (Table A2 in the
Appendix). Then we experiment with the instruments of ALMP and show their
effects through comparison with the basic scenario (3) of the mixed economy
(Tables A2 and A3). The vector of policy instruments is  , , , , ( i i i i y e τ µ
) , , , i A R g G G
i i γ :  i e  measures the efficacy of the placement service with regard
to the unemployed workers of type i,  i µ  and  i τ  are the portions of the unem-
ployed who are available for job placement by the PES and who are willing to
work,  i y  denotes the productivity of type-i workers,  i R G  is a hiring subsidy for
firms that have filled their registered vacancy with an unemployed worker of
type i sent by the PES,  i A G is a (re-employment) bonus for workers who have
found a job through the search market, γ  represents the probability that an
unemployed worker who does not engage in search is detected by the PES,
and  i g  is a penalty for the unemployed who are not searching actively.
PARAMETERS AND MATCHING FUNCTIONS. To the extent that estimates for Ger-
many exist, we base our choice of parameters on those values. Where we
have degrees of freedom, the choice is guided by the intention of generating
steady states with “interior solutions” and type-specific as well as aggregate
rates of unemployment similar to the German rates for 1998. Table A1 in the
Appendix shows the parameters of the basic scenario. Taking into account the15
bargaining power of workers in Germany and other OECD countries in
Europe, we assume that  70 . 0 = β . As in Germany (OECD 1997), a match has
an expected lifetime of  10 / 1 = s  periods; an unskilled worker has 70% of the
productivity, and UI benefits amount to 37.5% of the productivity of a skilled
worker. In the basic scenario of the mixed economy (s. Table A2) with
5 . 37 = b  the replacement ratio for the skilled is 39% and that for the unskilled
is 56%; using the fractions of those groups in the labour force as weights we
can calculate a weighted replacement ratio of 44%. According to Franz (1999,
p. 266), replacement ratios in Germany are 41,9% for men and 38,8% for
women. Unit costs for the advertisement of a vacancy are a linear function of
the aggregate number of vacancies,  A k A k = ) ( , where  70 . 0 = k . The search
costs for an active job seeker are  c ai , with  30 = c . The intensity of the search
depends on the position of the job seeker in the ranking order of the search
market. First-rate job seekers make up to  3 . 1 = + i a  and second-rate job
seekers up to  6 . 0 = − i a  applications per period. The matching functions of the
PES and the search market are of the Cobb-Douglas type
Φ Θ µ µ Θ
− =
1 ) / ( ) , , ( i i i i i i e e Q , (24)
φ θ θ
− =
1 ) / ( ) , ( i i i i a f a q ,  2 , 1 = i , (25)
with  i i i U R / = Θ , and  A Si i / = θ . For the scale factor f of the matching func-
tion representing the search market it is assumed that  45 . 0 = f . Within the
PES technology, the unemployed dominate the number of contacts which the
PES arranges with an elasticity of  7 / 6 1 = − Φ . In the search market, on the
contrary, the advertised vacancies with an elasticity of  10 / 7 = φ  determine the
number of successful job fillings. By comparison: Burda and Wyplosz (1994)
estimate elasticities of the number of unemployed between 0.70 and 0.80 for
matching technologies with constant returns to scale, and Burda (1994) re-
ports an estimate for western Germany of 0.88.
BASIC SCENARIO. The basic scenarios in Table A2 include the steady states of
three regimes. (1) is a laissez-faire economy with a partially integrated PES
responsible only for UI. Unemployed workers can find a job only through ac-
tive search. In (2) there is no private search market. Only the PES registers
jobs and vacancies and arranges matches between them. In this economy
there is no ranking of the unemployed. The separation of types takes place ex
ante when jobs and workers are assigned to different registers. (3) represents
the mixed economy with a fully integrated PES and a search market where
workers who have not been placed by the PES randomly search for a job.16
Under the regimes (2) and (3), job seekers base their wage demands not only
on the UI benefits but also on the placement activity of the PES. Compared to
the laissez-faire economy, the placement service obviously causes a redistri-
bution from profit to wage income. In the mixed economy, the wage for skilled
workers ( 2 . 96 1 = w ) is 18.3% higher and the wage for the unskilled
( 3 . 67 2 = w ) is 11.6% higher than in the laissez-faire economy. The search
rates in the laissez-faire economy are  % 90 1 = σ  and  % 60 2 = σ , where
i i i U S / = σ , since in this economy all unemployed who are willing to work
prefer to search actively, such that  i i τ σ − = 1 . A completely integrated PES
with job placement activities curbs the incentive to engage in active job
search. In the mixed economy the search rate of type-1 workers is only 48%
and that of type-2 workers is 32.2%. Since the number of job seekers has a
positive influence on the number of advertised vacancies via search external-
ities, a fully integrated PES also reduces the number of advertisements from
85 = A  under the laissez-faire regime to  4 . 21 = A  in the mixed economy.
If we deduct private and public search and placement costs from the gross
product of the economy we can take the resulting per capita consumption C
as a welfare measure
[] u k L A k L R k c a u y u C P
i
i i R i i i i i i − − ∑ − − − =
=
/ / ) 1 ( 2 2
1
σ λ . (26)
With placement costs of the PES equal to  40 = P k  per unemployed worker we
have a per capita consumption of 77.2 in the mixed economy and 75.5 in the
PES-administered economy. Under the laissez-faire regime, on the other
hand, per capita consumption is only 66.7. The placement costs of the PES
would have to more than double ( 90 = P k ) in order for the per capita con-
sumption in the mixed economy to drop to the level observed in the laissez-
faire regime.
The last columns of Tables A2 and A3 contain indices for the active and pas-
sive measures of labour market policy. Here, PLMP is defined as UI benefits
per unemployed worker divided by the gross product per capita of the working







i i i y u L BP λ . (27)
Finally, the expenses per unemployed worker for ALMP are measured as a
percentage of the gross product per capita of the labour force and the sum of17
the expenses for active and passive labour market policies are measured as a
percentage of the gross product,  BP A P / ) ( + . The expenses for PLMP
amount to 5.9% in the laissez-faire economy, 5.5% in the mixed economy,
and 7.5% in the PES economy. By way of comparison, in the years 1996-97
Denmark’s expenses for PLMP were 4% of GDP, in Germany the rate was
2.5% (OECD 1998). Unlike the GDP, the gross product as defined in (27)
does not include public expenditures or investments. PLMP is 46.4% in the
mixed economy, and 46.9% in the laissez-faire economy; in the PES econ-
omy, due to a higher rate of unemployment among the unskilled, the percent-
age is 48.3%.
Result 1: Not only the UI benefits but also the public placement service per se
considerably strengthens the workers’ bargaining position and causes a redis-
tribution from profit to wage income. Moreover, the placement service curbs the
incentives to engage in active job search, and reduces the search rates and the
aggregate number of advertised vacancies. Nevertheless, the per capita con-
sumption may be higher, and the aggregate rate of unemployment as well as
the expenditure ratio may be lower in the mixed economy than in the laissez-
faire regime.
PES  PLACEMENT,  JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT TRAINING. The
placement effort of the PES is the most important instrument of ALMP. Tables
A3.1 and A3.2 show variations of the placement efficacy manifesting in the
match probability  i e .  i e  denotes the probability that a contact between a reg-
istered worker of type i and a registered vacancy will lead to a job contract.
With growing  1 e  the tightness between the registers for type 1 increases and
so does the PES transition rate  1 P . For example for  1 1 = e  we find an increase
in the tightness between the registers of  = − 1 1 1 1 / / U U R R ∆ ∆   = − − − ) 2 . 5 ( 2 . 3
% 0 . 2 . The PES and the search market are competing matching devices. With
higher efficacy, the PES crowds out active job seekers and advertised vacan-
cies. With the probability of a match increasing to  1 1 = e , the number of type-1
job seekers falls by 19.1%,  1 . 19 / 1 1 − = S S ∆ . The smaller number of active job
seekers reduces the incentive to advertise vacancies. Thus, compared to the
basic scenario, there are 8.4% fewer ads. During the adjustment, active job
seekers of type 2 are subject to two opposing forces. On the one hand, the
search market becomes more attractive for workers of type 2 because the
congestion externality from the higher-ranking type 1 is reduced; on the other
hand, the number of advertised vacancies drops. The negative effect domi-
nates, and the number of active job seekers of type 2 decreases by 4.6%. The
number of unemployed type-1 workers is reduced because both the transition18
rate of the PES and the transition rate of the search market increase,
2 . 5 / 1 1 − = U U ∆ . While the PES transition rate for type-2 workers remains un-
changed, their transition rate in the search market is reduced, and the number
of unemployed of type 2 grows,  4 . 1 / 2 2 = U U ∆ . The unemployment rate for
type 1 decreases by 0.5 percentage points to 8.5%, while the unemployment
rate for type 2 increases by 0.3 percentage points to 18.7%. Nevertheless, the
aggregate rate of unemployment is slightly reduced, since type 1 at 70% rep-
resents the larger part of the labour force. Both search rates decrease. That of
type 1 is reduced by 7 percentage points when the placement efficacy
reaches  1 1 = e , and that of type 2 by 1.9 percentage points. The higher effi-
cacy of the PES placement enables type-1 applicants to demand wages that
are 0.3% higher than those in the basic scenario. Per capita consumption
grows by 1%, and PLMP decreases by 0.2 percentage points to 46.2%, while
the expenditure ratio  BP A P / ) ( +  falls by 0.1 percentage points to 5.4%.
If the PES expands its placement capacity for unemployed type-2 workers,
this reorganisation has no influence on the transition and arrival rates of type-
1 job seekers. This is because the PES has separate registers for the two
types, and in the ranking order of the search market, type 1 is preferred over
type 2. With growing  2 e  the number of active job seekers decreases since the
chance of being offered a job through the PES increases. For  80 . 0 2 = e , the
number of active type-2 job seekers decreases by 16.1%, and the search rate
2 σ  falls by 2.8 percentage points to 29.4%. Due to the search externalities,
the number of advertised vacancies decreases, which prompts type-1 job
seekers to reduce their search activities. The number of unemployed workers
of type 1 increases by 1.1%, and their unemployment rate  1 u  reaches 9.1%.
By contrast, the unemployment rate of type-2 workers falls by 1.5 percentage
points to 16.1%, and the aggregate rate decreases by 0.4 percentage points
to 11.4%.
Layard et al. (1991) give two arguments for the positive employment effects of
ALMP. The competition argument says that the participants in training pro-
grammes become more competitive, thus intensifying competition in the la-
bour market and reducing the upward pressure on wages. According to the
productivity argument, active policies augment the productivity of the partici-
pants, thus increasing the demand for labour. To test these hypotheses we
conduct the following experiments. First we increase the portion of unskilled
workers participating in ALMP programmes ( 2 µ  decreases, s. Tab. A3.3).
Second we assume that schooling programmes of the PES, the training of19
prosocial behaviour, the improvement of search strategies etc., enlarge the
number of unskilled who are able and willing to work and, through that chan-
nel, increase labour supply ( 2 τ  increases, s. Tab. A3.4). Third active meas-
ures raise the productivity of the unskilled ( 2 y  increases, s. Tab. A3.5). Finally
we can compare the consequences of the productivity effect generated by
PES programmes with an educational strategy which would increase not the
productivity of the unskilled but instead the portion of skilled workers among
the labour force ( 1 λ  increases, s. Tab. A3.6).
If the PES increases the number of unemployed in ALMP programmes,  2 µ
decreases and – as shown in Section 2 – so does the transition rate of unem-
ployed type-2 workers who are available for job placement  2 P . Therefore, the
rate  2 2P µ  must fall as well. Thus, we can infer from equation (23) that the un-
employment rate of the unskilled increases. In our simulation it increases by
1.5 percentage points to 19.9%, if  90 . 0 2 = µ . With  90 . 0 2 = µ , 10% of the un-
skilled unemployed participate in ALMP programmes, that is 0.6% of the la-
bour force. By comparison, in Germany in 1997 the inflow into ALMP pro-
grammes amounted to 3.6% of the labour force (OECD 1998).
If ALMP increases the portion of unskilled who are willing and able to work,
then the tightness between the registers for type 2 increases, and so do the
PES transition rate  2 P  and the rate  2 2P µ . However, the growing attractive-
ness of the PES placement at the same time reduces the number of active job
seekers among the type-2 unemployed, an effect that has a negative impact
on the number of advertised vacancies and finally also on the number of ac-
tive type-1 job seekers. Nevertheless, the tightness in the submarkets for type
1 remains unchanged so that with respect to equation (12) the increased
tightness in the search market for type-2 workers increases their transition
rate  2 p . Since the search rate  2 σ  also increases,  2 u  decreases. In our simu-
lation  2 u  decreases by 2.3 percentage points to 16.1%, if  70 . 0 2 = τ . Simulta-
neously the per capita consumption C grows by 1%, while the expenditure ra-
tio decreases by 0.4 percentage points to 5.2%. Thus we see, that – contrary
to the received competition argument – it is not a lower wage which stimulates
the demand for type-2 workers but the increased arrival rate of the unem-
ployed at the registered vacancies,  2 2Q τ . With growing  2 τ  all three rates  2 P ,
2 2P µ  and  2 2Q τ  increase and, due to the growing tightness, there is even a
small wage increase for type-2 workers.20
If ALMP increases the productivity of type-2 workers, the numbers of both
registered and advertised vacancies for type-2 increase. The increase in ad-
vertisements also prompts the first-ranking unemployed to intensify their
search so that the unemployment rates for both types drop. For  80 2 = y  in the
steady state, the unemployment rates reach values of 8.7% for type 1 and
16.7% for type 2, s. Tab. A3.5. At the same time, per capita consumption
grows by 4%, while the expenditure ratio for active and passive measures falls
by 0.5 percentage points to 5%.
Result 2: The probability of a match,  i e , and the percentage of unemployed
who are able and willing to work,  2 τ , produce crowding out effects. Increasing
the labour supply through active measures which raise  2 τ  causes a higher
transition rate into employment as well as a higher arrival rate at the registered
vacancies such that the type-specific and the aggregate rate of unemployment
decline, although contrary to the competition argument the transitions are ac-
companied by a higher wage  2 w . Table 1 shows the elasticities of the unem-
ployment rates and the per capita consumption with respect to the different ac-
tive measures calculated as unweighted averages of the simulation results. If,
for example, the probability  2 e  that a contact between an unskilled worker and
a registered vacancy leads to a match increases by one percent, the unem-
ployment rate for type-2 workers decreases by 0.63%, the aggregate rate falls
by 0.24% and per capita consumption increases by 0.05%.
Table 1: Elasticities of unemployment rates and per capita consumption with respect to the
probability of a match  i e , the population portions  2 2 2 , , y τ µ , and the productivity  2 λ .
1 u 2 u uC
1 e – 0.50 0.13 – 0.20 0.10
2 e 0.08 – 0.63 – 0.24 0.05
2 µ 0 – 0.76 – 0.36 0.06
2 τ 0.01 – 0.86 – 0.37 0.06
2 y – 0.24 – 0.70 – 0.45 0.29
1 λ 0.33 – 1.24 – 0.78 0.38
HIRING SUBSIDIES. Hiring subsidies,  i R G , are paid only to firms that register
their vacancies with the PES and employ workers sent by the PES. Hiring
subsidies augment the placement success of the PES, curb the dynamics of
the search market, crowd out job seekers and advertised vacancies, increase
unemployment, drive a wedge between the bargained wage of the PES-
administered labour market and the wage of the search market, and reduce21
per capita consumption. The PES improves its placement success through
wage subsidies, because the latter have a positive effect on the transition rate
of subsidised workers  i P , on the number of unemployed workers  i U , and thus
also on the number of new job contracts. However, the PES competes with
the search market, where the dynamic is weakened as soon as the PES sub-
sidises the wage costs of firms with registered vacancies. Especially among
those workers who are eligible for subsidies, the number of active job seekers
decreases and the search rates drop. Then, due to negative externalities, the
suppliers of advertised vacancies withdraw, and the number of active job
seekers decreases even among those unemployed who are not eligible for
subsidisation. In addition, subsidised workers negotiate over higher wages,
thus acquiring a share of the hiring subsidies the size of which depends on
their bargaining power.
Although hiring subsidies are paid only to registered firms, they can influence
the ranking order in the search market (Table A3.7). With a subsidy  35
1 = R G ,
unemployed type-1 workers who have not been offered a job through the PES
but have found one through their own search effort, achieve a wage increase
of 1.3% compared to the basic scenario. This increase of wage costs for jobs
that are filled through the search market is sufficient to change the ranking or-
der in favour of type-2 workers. The new ranking order prompts a sharp in-
crease in unemployment for workers of type 1 who now rank second and a
corresponding decrease in unemployment for type-2 workers who in the new
steady state, are preferred by employers as a consequence of the wage cost
effects of the hiring subsidy.
In the ALMP column, the tables show the hiring subsidy per unemployed
worker as a percentage of the gross product per capita of the labour force. In
the OECD countries between 1989 and 1994, ALMP varied between 3.0% in
the US and 59.3% in Sweden; the corresponding value for western Germany
was 25.7% (Nickell 1997). In our simulation, ALMP is 14.9% for a hiring sub-
sidy  30
1 = R G  but only 5.7% for  30
2 = R G . Tables A3.7 and A3.8 also show
the expenditure ratio for active and passive labour market measures which, for
example, for  30
2 = R G  is 6.5%, one percentage point higher than in the basic
scenario. Finally, the tables indicate that hiring subsidies are concomitant with
declining per capita consumption. With  30
1 = R G , for example, C is 0.9%
lower than in the basic scenario.
Result 3: Hiring subsidies augment the placement success of the PES, but on
the aggregate level taking into account the effects of search externalities they22
crowd out active job seekers and advertised vacancies, drive a wedge between
the wage of the PES-administered labour market and the wage of the search
market, reduce per capita consumption, and increase the aggregate unem-
ployment rate and the expenditure ratio.
(RE-EMPLOYMENT) BONUSES. A (re-employment) bonus paid by the PES to ac-
tive job seekers who have found a new job through their own search effort is
an often recommended but rarely implemented instrument of active labour
market policy. Bonuses improve the dynamics of the search market at the ex-
pense of the central placement service, reduce aggregate unemployment, in-
crease per capita consumption, and decrease the expenditure ratio for active
and passive labour market policies, thus financing themselves. A bonus paid
only to active job seekers has no effect on the tightness between the PES
registers. Therefore, the transition rates  i P  of the registered unemployed as
well as their arrival rates  i iQ τ  at the registered vacancies remain unaltered. In
the search market, the number of advertisements grows with the bonus, and
positive externalities increase the number of active job seekers. For  15
1 = A G
the search rate of type 1 is already 30 percentage points higher than in the
basic scenario so that  % 78 1 = σ . In spite of the greater number of advertised
vacancies, there is only a slight increase in the number of active job seekers
of type 2; this is due to the ranking order that job seekers are confronted with
in the search market. More vacancies also improve the chances for type 2, but
the growing number of type-1 job seekers produces congestion externalities,
the positive and negative externalities almost compensating each other.
Promoting active job search among the unskilled through a bonus 
2 A G  pro-
duces similar adjustments; in contrast to 
1 A G , 
2 A G  initially has no negative
external effects on type-1 workers, since the ranking order protects unem-
ployed workers of type 1 against competition from type-2 workers. However,
with an increasing bonus, the wage  2 ω  negotiated in the search market is re-
duced; with  25
2 = A G  the bonus has almost reached the level where the
ranking order is reversed, and, because of the bonus, firms prefer to employ
type-2 workers.
Result 4: In a labour market with several states which are interconnected by
positive and negative externalities from search, the instruments of ALMP cause
not only deadweight losses and substitution effects but also positive employ-
ment effects on unemployed workers and vacancies not directly supported by
the PES. The effects of the bonus payments substantiate this result. In addition,
the bonus for type-2 workers finances itself. For  25
2 = A G , the number of ac-
tive job seekers among the subsidised almost doubles, their rate of unemploy-23
ment decreases by 1.7 percentage points to 16.7%, and the expenditure ratio is
5.4%, which is 0.1 percentage points lower than in the basic scenario.
ASSISTANCE FOR PROBLEM GROUPS. There is a theorem in labour market re-
search that subsidies are more effective the more precisely they are tailored to
particular “problem groups”. The following experiments do not provide an all-
out confirmation of this theorem. In the usage of labour market research, the
unskilled unemployed do constitute a “problem group”: the rate of unemploy-
ment (18.4%) and the number of workers who are unable or not willing to take
up work (40%) are higher than average, while the productivity (70%) and the
number of active job seekers (32.2%) are comparatively low.
If the PES subsidises the unskilled with a combination of hiring subsidies and
bonuses, the tightness between the registers for type 2 increases so that the
PES-generated transition rate of the unskilled and the number of matches in-
crease (see Table A3.11). In addition, the bonus for active job seekers among
the unskilled provides an incentive for firms to advertise more vacancies, and,
due to positive externalities, also increases the number of active job seekers
among workers of type 1. On the other hand, the subsidy  15 2 = G  reduces the
unemployment rate of the problem group by only 0.4 percentage points to
18%, and the aggregate rate of unemployment by 0.2 percentage points to
11.6%. C grows by 0.1%, ALMP reaches 3.9%, and the expenditure ratio in-
creases by 0.4 percentage points to 5.9%. If, instead, active job search is
promoted with  15 = A G  (see Table A3.12) the unemployment rate of the
problem group falls to 16.9%, that of the skilled workers is reduced to 7.9%,
and the aggregate rate of unemployment is 10.6%. C grows by 0.8%, and
ALMP increases to 5.9%, but the expenditure ratio for passive and active pol-
icy measures is practically unchanged, because the bonus payments are cov-
ered by saved UI benefits.
Result 5: Considering the unemployment rates, the expenses for PLMP, the
expenditure ratio for active and passive labour market policies, and per capita
consumption, it turns out that promoting active job search instead of subsidising
the “problem group” of unskilled worker is the more effective strategy.
SEARCH RULE. Apart from the bonuses, the PES can use the probability that
shirking is detected, γ , and the penalty,  i g , to increase the search rates and
to decrease the unemployment rates. Considering their effect on the rates of
unemployment, on per capita consumption, and on the expenditure ratio, pen-
alties against unemployed type-2 workers who violate the search rule are
more effective. If unemployed type-1 workers who are not searching actively24
are fined, the search rate  1 σ  increases, but the negative externalities on the
gains from search of the second-rate group generated by a higher search rate
of the first-rate group can even reduce the search rate among type-2 workers
thereby augmenting the rate of unemployment. Compared to type-specific
penalties, general penalties with  2 , 1 , = = i g gi  are most effective, but, in an
environment with risk-neutral agents, their consequences are comparable to
those of an increase in the probability of a check γ .
With higher penalties, the endogenous reservation income of the workers is
reduced, profits are increased and so are the market values of filled jobs. New
vacancies are registered and new jobs are advertised in the search market.
With a 10% probability that shirking is detected and a penalty  10 2 = g  for
violations of the search rule (see Table A3.13) the search rate for type 2 in-
creases to 33.1% and the unemployment rate decreases to 18.3%. If the pen-
alty is increased to  100 2 = g  – that is, 150% of the wage for employed work-
ers of type 2 –  2 u  is reduced to 17.6%, the aggregate rate of unemployment
decreases by 0.3 percentage points to 11.5%, and the steady state expendi-
ture ratio for labour market measures amounts to 5.2%, 0.3 percentage points
less than in the basic scenario. For the PES such penalties mean savings be-
cause it actually pays less in UI benefits to the workers. Those savings can be
calculated as follows:  i i i i i g P S U γ ) 1 )( ( − ∑ − . There are  i i S U −  unemployed
workers of type i who are not searching actively thus violating the search rule.
Of those, a fraction  i P − 1  is not offered a job through the PES, while a fraction
γ  of the violations are detected through PES checks and fined with a penalty
i g .
A 10% probability of a check combined with a penalty of 10 units of output for
both types of unemployed increases the tightness between the registers, the
number of active job seekers, and the number of advertised vacancies, thus
reducing the rates of unemployment. Even if the probability of a check is
raised to 100%, the search rates increase by only 10.1 percentage points for
type-2 and 7.2 percentage points for type-1 workers compared to the basic
scenario. In the steady state, only 42.3% of the unemployed type-2 workers
and 55.2% of the unemployed type-1 workers are actively looking for a job.
Per capita consumption is 0.4% higher than in the basic scenario, and the ex-
penditure rate for labour market policies less the savings due to withheld UI
benefits is reduced by 0.5 percentage points to 5% of the gross product.
Result 6: Considering their effect on the rate of unemployment, on per capita
consumption, and on the expenditure ratio, general penalties against unem-25
ployed workers who violate the search rule are more effective than type-specific
sanctions, and fines against shirkers of the second-rate group are more suc-
cessful than fines against members of the first-rate group. Sanctioning viola-
tions of the search rule generates crowding-in effects. But even if the probability
of a check is 100%, only a fraction of the unemployed who have not been
placed by the PES actively search for a job.
5. SUMMARY
A fully integrated PES strengthens the bargaining power of the job applicants,
increases the bilaterally negotiated wages, reduces the incentive to engage in
active job search, and decreases both the search rates and the number of ad-
vertised vacancies. Nevertheless, compared with the laissez-faire regime the
implementation of the job placement function of the PES decreases the ag-
gregate rate of unemployment and increases per capita consumption. Of all
the instrument variables of ALMP, (1) the probabilities of a match, (2) the
number of unskilled workers who are not interested in a job, and (3) the hiring
subsidies generate crowding-out effects. The portion of unemployed type-2
workers who participate in programmes of the ALMP and are not available for
the placement service is neutral with respect to the employment situation of
type-1 workers. Due to positive externalities from search, (4) higher productiv-
ity of the unskilled, (5) (re-employment) bonuses as a reward for active job
search, (6) penalties for violations of the search rule, and (7) the probability of
shirking being detected by the PES reduce the unemployment rate not only of
the target group but also of the competing group of unemployed workers. Fi-
nally, (8) assisting specific “problem groups” is less effective than promoting
active job search, if the effects on unemployment rates, per capita consump-
tion, and expenditure ratios are considered.
Hiring subsidies and (re-employment) bonuses drive a wedge between the
wages in the PES-administered labour market and the wages on the search
market. Hiring subsidies improve the placement success of the PES. But they
also paralyse the dynamics of the search market, since with the subsidies and
the growing number of registered vacancies, the unemployed become less
interested in active job search, and the number of advertised vacancies drops.
Contrary to the well-known competition effect, an increasing fraction of un-
skilled workers who after taking part in measures of ALMP are able or willing
to work reduce type-specific and aggregate unemployment as a consequence
of a simultaneous increase in the transition rate and the expected arrival rate26
of workers of type 2 at the registered vacancies. The elasticities of the unem-
ployment rates and per capita consumption with respect to the instruments of
ALMP are relatively low. This result mirrors the ambiguity found in the macro-
econometric regressions cited in the introduction, where the correlation be-
tween specific ALMP instruments and the aggregate rate of unemployment
often is not significant.
In order to further extend the theoretical analysis of ALMP, the model can be
supplemented with the labour market segment where unemployed and em-
ployed workers who are not registered with the PES search for new jobs.
Furthermore, the influence of ALMP on the reservation productivity and the
separation rate should be integrated into the model.APPENDIX
Table A1: The parameter of the model
β rs 1 y 2 y b R k k P k c + i a − i a 1 µ 2 µ 1 τ 2 τ 1 e 2 e f Φ φ 1 λ L
0.70 0.04 0.10 100 70 37.5 45 0.70 40 30 1.30 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.60 0.90 0.70 0.45 1/7 7/10 0.70 500
Table A2: Basic scenarios of the laissez-faire economy (1), the centrally administrated labor market (2), and the mixed economy (3)


















(1) –– 37.2 25.7 85.0 33.5 15.4 48.9 10.6 17.2 12.6 90.0 60.0 77.7 – 81.3 – 60.3 66.7 46.9 – 5.9
(2) 18.3 4.7 42.8 34.7 –––– 12.2 24.1 15.8 ––– 96.2 – 67.3 – 75.5 48.3 – 7.5
(3) 13.4 3.7 31.3 27.5 21.4 15.1 8.9 23.9 9.0 18.4 11.8 48.0 32.2 40.6 96.2 96.2 67.3 67.3 77.2 46.4 – 5.5
Table A3: The effects of ALMP instruments on the steady state of the mixed economy


















































92 . 0 1 = e – 0.6 0.3 – 1.0 0.3 – 1.8 – 4.3 – 1.0 – 3.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 1.6 – 0.4 – 1.1 0.1 0.1 –– 0.2 0.0 – 0.0
00 . 1 1 = e – 3.2 1.4 – 5.2 1.4 – 8.4 – 19.1 – 4.6 – 13.7 – 0.5 0.3 – 0.2 – 7.0 – 1.9 – 4.8 0.3 0.3 –– 1.0 – 0.2 ––  0.1
Tab. A3.2: The probability of a match  2 e
72 . 0 2 = e 0.2 – 0.9 0.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 3.6 – 1.7 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.4 –– 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 – 0.0
80 . 0 2 = e 1.1 – 4.8 1.1 – 8.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 16.1 – 7.8 0.1 – 1.5 – 0.4 – 1.9 – 2.8 – 1.9 –– 0.4 0.4 0.7 – 0.1 ––  0.2
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98 . 0 2 = µ ––  0.5 – 1.5 ––––– 0.3 0.1 ––  0.5 – 0.3 –––– –  0.1 0.0 – 0.0
90 . 0 2 = µ ––  2.6 – 8.2 ––––– 1.5 0.5 ––  2.4 – 1.5 –––– –  0.7 0.2 – 0.2
Tab. A3.5: The percentage of active and passive job seekers among the unskilled unemployed  2 τ
62 . 0 2 = τ 0.0 0.6 0.0 – 2.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.6 – 0.3 ––  0.5 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.7 0.4 –– 0.0 0.0 0.2 – 0.1 ––  0.1
70 . 0 2 = τ 0.2 2.7 0.2 – 12.5 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 2.8 – 1.4 ––  2.3 – 0.7 – 0.3 3.5 1.9 –– 0.1 0.1 1.0 – 0.3 ––  0.3
Tab. A3.6: The productivity of the unskilled  2 y
72 2 = y – 0.6 4.4 – 0.6 – 1.9 1.7 1.7 9.7 4.7 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.1 1.1 3.8 2.4 –– 2.8 2.8 0.8 – 0.3 ––  0.1
80 2 = y – 3.2 20.1 – 3.2 – 9.2 8.7 8.7 53.0 25.1 – 0.3 – 1.7 – 0.7 5.9 22.0 13.4 –– 13.8 13.8 4.0 – 1.7 ––  0.5
Tab. A3.7: The percentage of the skilled among the labor force  1 λ
72 . 0 1 = λ 3.9 – 8.7 3.9 – 8.7 –––– 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 1.8 3.1 0.8 –––– 1.1 – 0.4 ––  0.2
80 . 0 1 = λ 19.5 – 43.7 19.5 – 43.7 –––– 0.4 – 2.9 – 1.2 – 7.8 25.0 4.5 –––– 5.3 – 1.9 ––  0.8
Tab. A3.8: The hiring subsidy 
1 R G
5
1 = R G 3.4 0.8 2.2 0.8 – 4.6 – 10.8 – 2.5 – 7.8 0.2 0.1 0.2 – 6.1 – 1.0 – 3.7 0.7 0.2 –– –  0.1 0.1 2.4 0.4
15 = R G 10.1 2.3 6.4 2.3 – 13.5 – 30.1 – 7.5 – 21.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 – 16.5 – 3.1 – 10.2 2.1 0.5 –– –  0.4 0.3 7.3 1.2
30 = R G 19.8 4.7 12.0 4.7 – 25.9 – 53.3 – 15.0 – 39.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 – 28.0 – 6.1 – 17.8 4.1 1.1 –– –  0.9 0.5 14.9 2.4
35
1 = R G 34.2 – 19.6 24.1 – 19.6 – 28.5 – 55.0 – 24.8 – 43.8 2.2 – 3.6 0.4 – 30.6 – 2.1 – 18.6 4.8 1.3 –– –  0.3 0.4 20.2 2.7
Tab. A3.9: The hiring subsidy 
2 R G
5
2 = R G 0.6 3.4 0.6 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.8 – 9.9 – 4.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 – 1.2 – 3.5 – 2.3 –– 1.0 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.2
15
2 = R G 1.9 10.2 1.9 3.2 – 5.2 – 5.2 – 28.2 – 13.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 – 3.3 – 9.8 – 6.4 –– 2.9 0.7 – 0.3 0.1 2.8 0.5
30
2 = R G 3.6 20.8 3.6 6.4 – 9.9 – 9.9 – 51.8 – 25.4 0.3 1.2 0.6 – 6.3 – 17.6 – 11.7 –– 5.8 1.4 – 0.6 0.3 5.7 1.0
2




















































1 = A G – 3.0 – 0.9 – 3.0 – 0.9 5.8 14.3 3.0 10.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 8.6 1.3 5.1 ––  0.2 –– 0.1 – 0.1 1.1 0.0
15
1 = A G – 9.5 – 2.8 – 9.5 – 2.8 17.9 47.1 9.0 32.9 – 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.7 30.0 3.9 17.0 ––  0.7 –– 0.4 – 0.4 3.9 0.0
Tab. A3.11: The (re-employment) bonus 
2 A G
5
2 = A G – 0.9 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 1.8 2.4 2.4 14.0 6.7 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.2 1.6 5.2 3.3 ––– –  0.3 0.1 – 0.1 0.4 0.0
15
2 = A G – 2.7 – 5.5 – 2.7 – 5.5 7.5 7.5 45.2 21.5 – 0.2 – 1.0 – 0.5 5.1 17.3 10.8 ––– –  0.9 0.4 – 0.2 1.4 – 0.1
25
2 = A G – 4.7 – 9.3 – 4.7 – 9.3 12.9 12.9 80.0 38.0 – 0.4 – 1.7 – 0.8 8.8 32.0 19.6 ––– –  1.6 0.7 – 0.4 2.6 – 0.1
Tab. A3.12: The promotion of unskilled workers with  2 2 2 G G G A R = =
5 2 = G – 0.2 1.5 – 0.2 – 0.7 0.6 0.6 3.4 1.6 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.8 –– 1.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.1
15 2 = G – 0.6 4.6 – 0.6 – 2.0 1.8 1.8 10.2 4.9 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 1.2 4.0 2.5 –– 2.9 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.1 3.9 0.4
30 2 = G – 1.3 9.0 – 1.3 – 4.0 3.6 3.6 20.9 10.0 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.3 2.4 8.3 5.2 –– 5.8 – 0.5 0.3 – 0.1 8.0 0.8
Tab. A3.13: The promotion of active job seekers with  A A A G G G = =
2 1
5 = A G – 3.9 – 2.7 – 3.9 – 2.7 8.2 16.9 17.3 17.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.4 10.4 6.6 8.6 ––  0.2 ––  0.3 0.3 – 0.2 1.5 0.0
15 = A G – 12.2 – 8.2 – 12.2 – 8.2 24.8 55.7 55.9 55.8 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.2 37.1 22.4 29.9 ––  0.7 ––  0.9 0.8 – 0.6 5.9 0.0
Tab. A3.14: The penalty  2 g  for violations against the search requirement, if  1 . 0 = γ
10 2 = g – 0.1 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.5 0.4 0.4 2.3 1.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.6 –– –  0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.0
100 2 = g – 1.4 9.9 – 1.4 – 4.4 4.0 4.0 23.2 11.1 – 0.1 – 0.8 – 0.3 2.6 9.3 5.8 –– –  0.5 – 0.5 0.3 – 0.1 ––  0.3
Tab. A3.15: The probability that shirking is detected γ , if  10 2 1 = = g g
1 . 0 = γ 0.0 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.5 0.7 1.1 2.4 1.6 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 ––  0.1
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